Assessment of USAID/Ecuador's Strategy to Conserve Biodiversity on Indigenous Lands

FINAL REPORT

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Executive Summary

This report is the result of six weeks of fieldwork in Ecuador during June and July, 2005. During this time the consultants visited with seven lowland indigenous groups and interviewed or listened to presentations from over 300 people regarding the projects that work with indigenous groups, the relationship to green areas of those groups, the threats to their own survival and threats to biodiversity, and the strengths and weaknesses of their organizations. The CAIMAN project has approached biodiversity protection through supporting indigenous groups to obtain territorial integrity, satisfy capacity-building needs, and insure financial sustainability. During the process of CAIMAN, certain strategic questions have emerged. In the Terms of Reference for the present report, some key questions were asked. This Executive Summary attempts to answer them by drawing on the report itself which is organized along somewhat different lines.

Q. Is the strategy focused on the most important elements of threats and opportunities?
A. The threats are clear enough: colonization, logging, hydrocarbon exploitation, under-managed protected areas with little delegated authority to indigenous people, and perhaps global warming. It is difficult to conceive of a better strategy than enlisting the support of indigenous residents to protect green areas by actually turning land over to them legally and then helping them technically with management issues. Approaching biodiversity conservation through consolidation of indigenous land tenure has been shown to be a successful strategy elsewhere when accompanied by:

1. legal structures allowing territorial titling and granting administrative authority to indigenous organizations;
2. competent and representative indigenous organizations;
3. availability of outside technical assistance;
4. scientific support directed toward indigenous audiences themselves regarding basic resource management questions;

In this sense, the USAID strategy has addressed #1 under existing policy and regulations, has tended to work relatively well at #2 and #3 although perhaps not at a local enough level and has addressed #4 only occasionally because not enough indigenous groups have solid enough control over their land to be able to make management decisions that can be widely applied and indigenous organizations are not the legal administrators of ethnic territories.

Q. Are we working with the right people and at the right level?
A. Work with the indigenous federations themselves is fully justified. However, there are several recommendations that relate to the relations between project priorities, federations, communities and families:

1. More work with the policy environment would be strongly recommended.
2. Work with land consolidation should take precedence over economic development work that relies on creating markets, organizing communities for production, or competing head to head with the logging industry in the face of weakness in government controls. In the end, if the ethnic organizations are actually in a position to administer lands that they control, economic opportunities as yet unseen will present themselves. In this sense, for example, training people in business planning and helping them with connections is a better investment than trying to organize a resource management project for economic benefit through an NGO.
3. The legal framework for consolidating a single (or in some cases several) polygon(s) that is effectively an ethnic territory with a title administered by the

ethnic organization itself has not yet appeared in Ecuador. Were such a legal framework to be present, the work of consolidation would be cheaper and easier in the future and participation from communities and individuals would be easier to organize.

4. Avoid planning processes that are top-down and ethnocentric or that involve executing activities that are too complex for indigenous organizations.
5. Assisting organizations to develop better governance should involve ways of structuring input from elders through well-constructed permanent councils, as well as the current emphasis on administrative training. Such governing councils should also have requirements for geographic and gender representation.
6. Organizational stabilization, protection of territorial claims, and indigenous education need long-term, non-project-related funding that should involve the establishment of at least three trust funds. USAID should help organize these but may not need to be the unique donor. Of special importance is access to secondary education and USAID should consider a greater involvement with Ecuador's indigenous university experiment.
7. Quito-based national and international NGOs find it difficult to insure that indigenous communities and organizations are aligned. This problem requires organizations that are physically close to the area of indigenous residence, that have personnel who speak indigenous languages, and are in touch with community opinions and processes.
8. More work is recommended with the Secoya and Achuar organizations and with the Chachi *Marias del Sol*.
9. An increased concentration on women's organizations and income is indicated by the relative success of these activities under CAIMAN. Another area of future low cost concentration could involve aquaculture with native species at family levels. A third possibility would be community banks that offer micro-credit, a program administered by local foundations. The least probability of success is with income-related projects that depend on technology not understood by most people.
10. Some thought to working directly with FCAE, NAE, and FICSH should be given. It would help to have some clear guidelines and steps for organizations that want to work with USAID directly, along with some sort of "pre-certification" visitation process.

Q. Do there appear to be significant opportunities for success with the groups that we currently work with?
A. Defining success as a large green space or spaces sustainably protected by their own indigenous owners or co-managers with some outside assistance, the following observations are made:

1. With some changes in the protected area laws to permit legalization of indigenous lands in protected areas, there is a significant chance of success with the Cofán, partly because the Foundation for the Survival of the Cofán is so successful at community base work.
2. In the Awá case, some better overall strategy for community participation and communication needs to be devised and a law permitting territorial circumscription would help a good deal. Current strategies through the CTF and a few local economic projects with communities near roads are not comprehensive enough and the pressure on the communities to sell the forest is extreme. Action on the "Reserva de la Vida" seems to be very slow.

3. Success with the Waorani will be measured in generations, given the level of existing constraints. Modest success with women's incomes may be possible within a few years. Limited success would be achieving better management of the Yasuni Park and the participation of the Waorani in that management. Another limited success would be a common code of conduct and a monitoring system for relations between oil companies and the Waorani (as well as other groups).
4. A national ombudsman for indigenous affairs would further the chances of success with all groups.
5. Work with the Shuar and Achuar in territorial circumscription could be very successful, but a change in the legal framework may be necessary to permit this.
6. Success with the Chachi overall is unlikely as they seem extremely mixed with Afro-Ecuadorean colonists. However, there is a possibility of consolidating at least two smaller polygons if there were a legal framework to do so. The Grand Chachi Reserve may be successful as an experiment in direct conservation payments, and if it seems promising, much more work should go into extending the model.
7. In the future, the chances of success will increase with the opportunity to consolidate indigenous ethnic lands across international borders.

Q. To what extent should the strategy include groups residing outside indigenous territories?
A. The priorities should be to territorial consolidation and development within territorial limits. People living outside ethnic territories such as the Waorani in Puyo or Shuar around Macas, must be given lower priority. The unique exception should be support for indigenous education that may not necessarily take place within territorial boundaries.

Q. What are the most important lessons learned from other efforts that USAID might integrate into its efforts?
A.

1. The most enduring changes tend to be those in land tenure. The case of the Palcazu Valley in Peru is illustrative of what remains when chaos follows a project.
2. A successful case of green corridor community conservation involving the collaboration of 23 communities in Guatemala through a methodology of land tenure consolidation was supported by USAID/Guatemala in Chisec, Alta Verapaz between 2002 and 2004. The NGO involved is a Q'eqchi' NGO called SANK.
3. The BOSAWAS Biosphere Reserve in Nicaragua is worth studying as it is a case where indigenous people have titles and co-manage protected areas defined by them. Given enough land indigenous groups tend to create their own conservation projects. The Kuna are another example of this.
4. The lessons in Ecuador on how indigenous lowland groups can manage tourism successfully seem to be mainly with the lowland Kichwa. These should be studied.
5. The case of successful low-intensity income projects involving forest resources with the Sirionó in Bolivia deserves attention. The organization to contact would be CIDDEBENI in Trinidad.

Q. Should the Mission move slower over a longer time period with the indigenous groups?

A. Yes in some cases. Success may depend on some legal and policy changes that may take time to develop and successful indigenous organizations do not develop overnight. However, some cases such as the Awá case merit **more** intensity, given the biodiversity value of the forest and the threats it faces. Efforts to improve communication between FCAE and the communities should be undertaken. A participatory project to define the Reserva de la Vida needs development now; the benefits must involve a number of communities and be clearly defined. However, with the Waorani, efforts should be more in the background and involve an attempt to establish an ONHAE stabilization fund, to seek consensus on park management, and to maintain some input into ONHAE administrative training. Work with the Cofán ethnic organization should follow the lead of the FCS and probably maintain the same intensity as it now has, as it has the greatest probability of success.

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

Following the 10-year SUBIR program which made great strides toward bringing the issues of indigenous green areas to the forefront of national and international attention and trained a generation of sustainable natural resource managers, USAID/Ecuador focused on a strategy of working with indigenous groups in the protection of the green areas through the mechanisms of territorial consolidation, capacity building, and sustainable financing. This strategy is embodied in the CAIMAN project and in certain activities of the Programa Sur and the Programa Norte[1].

The basic premises that underlie the current biodiversity strategy include the following:

- Economies of the upper Amazon cannot be sustained if the resource base is mined unsustainably. The protection of biodiversity has both abstract and practical logic.
- Large green areas in upper watersheds produce an infinity of ecological services, not the least of which are climate control, water quality and flood control.
- The protection of biodiversity cannot be accomplished solely through parks and other people-free protected areas, partly because of the relatively small areas contained in them and partly because most governments lack the exercise of central power in areas remote from the capital that would allow green areas to be effectively protected.
- Biodiversity in most green areas can only be protected effectively if the people living in and about such areas accede to their protection. Many of these people are indigenous.[2]
- Support for indigenous control over green areas = biodiversity protection.

To these assumptions, the Programa Sur and Programa Norte, add the element of border security against foreign military incursion and the movement of narcotics and their precursor elements. The theory here is that development of infrastructural, economic, social support, and governance capabilities along both frontiers will predispose people to keep undesirable elements from using Ecuador as a safe haven for resistance activities against neighboring governments or from supporting the narcotics industry. Violence related to the implementation of Plan Colombia has intersected rather negatively with

[1] The Programa Norte cannot be evaluated, except through documents, by this consultant because security regulations from the U.S. Embassy prohibited the team from staying overnight anywhere near Ecuador's northern border.. These restrictions obviously placed a great deal more weight on interviews and very short field visits than would normally be the case. The suggestions made herein must be taken with that understanding.

[2] For the very convincing Central American case see the map, Chapin M. 2003. *Indigenous Peoples and Natural Ecosystems in Central America and Southern Mexico*. Washington, DC: Natl. Geogr. Soc.

development on the northern frontier, according to newspaper reports, and has made certain activities unfeasible. Nevertheless, both programs, North and South, make an additional assumption, that what is good for national development is also good for indigenous groups on the frontier. This assumption will be commented on later as it may not be justified either in terms of strengthening indigenous hold on green areas, strengthening their organizations, or especially their own ability to protect the frontier by amalgamating with their ethnic counterparts cross-border.

While certain stakeholders might argue that the logical/moral progression is backward (i.e., biodiversity protection should be seen as a byproduct of indigenous cultural survival rather than cultural survival being a byproduct of biodiversity protection[3]) in the end the practical activities that result from either approach are quite similar and they are entailed in the major activities and strategy of CAIMAN.

The people who live in the remaining large green areas are indigenous people of many distinct ethnolinguistic groups. They face many challenges to their ability, and indeed their willingness, to continue the protection of these areas because of a constellation of factors including massive waves of colonization pressure, hydrocarbon exploitation, logging, their increasing sense of poverty and the creation of protected areas in which the state asserts, but does not exercise, control.

The most fundamental assumption that must be examined is whether support for indigenous groups will equate with biodiversity protection. This is a very active debate in the conservation sciences. On one side is a faction typified by John Terborgh in biology and Shepherd Krech in anthropology[4] who believe that indigenous people cannot be allowed to exercise autonomy in or out of protected areas because they are no different than anyone else and no less susceptible to market pressures. They believe that indigenous conservation discourse is no more than rhetoric in the pursuit of political and cultural sovereignty and is not backed up by behavior. They also hold that only behaviors intentionally directed toward conservation can be considered conservation. By this they mean that the close statistical correspondence between the cultural survival of indigenous people and the biological survival of forested areas is a function of low population densities and primitive technologies.

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[3] See Stan Stevens *Conservation Through Cultural Survival* (1994, Island Press) for the construction of this argument

[4] Terborgh, J. 1999. Requiem for Nature. Island Press, Washington D.C.

Krech III, Shepard. 1999. The Ecological Indian: Myth and Reality. New York: W.W. Norton and Co.

On the other side, people like Schwartzman, Nepsted, Moeira and Gros, Camilo, and Asa, [5] representing biology, wildlife ecology and economics, and a host of anthropologists too numerous to mention (but see Bruce and Duin for a recent nearby appraisal in South America and Stocks et al for a test case in Central America parallel to Schwartzman et al[6]) have argued theoretically, and demonstrated empirically, that, under the right conditions indigenous people can and will protect large landscapes of forest while fully connected to markets and have done so without destroying the fauna. The case of the Cree people in Minnesota would support this construction. These scientists would hold with Raymond Dasmann[7] that conditions of economic infrastructure tend to range human populations along a continuum between "biosphere people" and "ecosystem people" depending on whether they are dependant principally on local ecosystems for subsistence or whether they are dependent on remote ecosystems with which they only interact through markets. Ecosystem people, under this theory, are more sensitive to changes in state of natural resource quality and have evolved many behaviors that are culturally embedded and subject to moral, rather than rational (means vs. ends), reasoning. These deeply embedded cultural elements are significant in shaping contemporary indigenous culture; how to maintain or favor them will be commented on below in Section III. However, it is true that even ecosystem people are no longer dependant only on local resources. Indeed some of them, like most of the Waorani population, are subject to extreme amounts of external pressures and subsidies that – in the minds of many in Ecuador– have made their relationship with renewable natural resources somewhat problematic. Notwithstanding, the key variable in the decision to defend the environment for most indigenous tropical forest groups seems to be the conditions under which they hold land or aspire to hold land and their organizational capability to protect resources. In the end, those variables may be key factors for the Waorani as well.

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[5] Schwartzman S, Moreira A, Nepstad D. 2000. Rethinking Tropical Forest Conservation: Perils in Parks. *Conserv. Biol.* 14:1351-57.

Gros, Paule, Gerardo Camilo, and Cheryl Asa. 2004. Effect of Indigenous Land Use on Mammal Populations in a Central American Rainforest. Paper presented to the annual meeting of the Society for Conservation Biology. New York City.

[6] Wilcox, Bruce A. and Kristin N. Duin. 1995. Indigenous Cultural and Biological Diversity: Overlapping Values of Latin American Ecoregions. Cult. Surv. Quarterly **18**(4),49-53 (1995).

Stocks A, McMahan B, and Taber P. 2005 Final Report Use of Remote Sensing Data to Compare the State of the Forest Under Indigenous and Mestizo Management in the Area of the Bosawas International Biosphere Reserve, Nicaragua. MS. TNC/Nicaragua. Document available from principal author.

[7] Dasmann, Raymond F.

1975 The Conservation Alternative. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

1976 National Parks, Nature Conservation, and "Future Primitives." The Ecologist 6(5):164-178.

In my opinion, the strategy of USAID/Ecuador is well-placed and scientifically justified, but the devil, as in most cases, is in the details. Section II presents an ideal situation, a series of desired outcomes, a star to steer by for the future and by which progress can be measured. Section III presents a few operational guidelines taken from a lifetime of working with the practical problems of conservation and indigenous organizations. Section IV presents a series of short-term and longer-term concrete recommendations for action over the next few years and Section V discusses some of the issues the might be relevant to relating the Programa Norte, Programa Sur, and the Amazon Basin Initiative to the work of supporting biodiversity conservation through supporting indigenous institutions.

SECTION II – IDEAL OUTCOMES FOR THE NEXT GENERATION

The following outcomes represent an ideal state of affairs or outcomes that would have the effect of protecting cultural integrity to the maximum extent while also protecting biodiversity. We present these in the spirit of a star to steer by. Getting to this ideal point, however, is the challenge and there are many obstacles to be overcome, including the following:

1. a patchwork of laws that can be applied to indigenous lands that permits, for example, communal titles to communities or “centers” but not titles to ethnic territories for defined ethnic groups (this is explained fully later in the report) or agreements for indigenous residence and use in certain protected areas, but not titles; lands are held by indigenous people under a number of modalities, but not all are compatible with conservation.
2. political will;
3. enforcement of existing natural resource and land laws and rules in the hinterland;
4. the legitimate, but narrow interests of the hydrocarbon and logging industries;
5. colonists who demand what they consider to be their own rights to land;
6. weaknesses in the current indigenous organizational structure and operational capacity (for many reasons not necessarily all related to indigenous culture);
7. the short memories of projects and donor agencies and frequent changes of their personnel;
8. the critical shortage of well-intentioned and committed outsiders who actually speak indigenous languages and understand indigenous cultures and who are willing to get their hands dirty in the applied area.

The list could easily be extended[8]. However, obstacles aside, the following goals should be attainable in time.

List of Ideal Outcomes

1. Each indigenous group has uncontested land rights in the form of a territorial title as an ethnic group (not as a series of Centers or Communes with agrarian reform titles, not as adjudications of national forest lands or *de facto* possession of ancestral lands, or written agreements with protected areas about use and management, etc.). Ideally such titles would cross national boundaries. When protected area law makes titling impossible, indigenous rights are clearly negotiated and indigenous people either manage or co-manage the protected area.

2. Each group is empowered, trained and funded to physically demarcate, patrol and defend its territorial boundaries.

3. Each indigenous territory is zoned and managed in a way that protects the long-term sustainability of the ecological processes that provide natural resources that are harvested. This implies the recognition and legitimation of indigenous protected areas (sources) as well as harvest areas (sinks) and implies that they are full partners in – indeed primary consumers of – scientific research into the nature and dynamics of the ecosystems they inhabit and the human impacts on natural resources.

4. The members of each group have income streams that do not degrade natural resources in unsustainable ways. Ideally such incomes would result directly from protection activities, activities related to research into natural resources or human impacts on them, sustainable natural resource management, tourism, education, health, or incidentally from servicing any of these activities.

5. Each group has a democratically-elected, legitimate and stably-funded organization with statutory geographic, gender and age representation over the territory. The organization is empowered and technically able to consult with its constituents about decisions that affect their well-being, to competently and honestly represent the group decisions to outside authorities, to convoke its members in periodic face-to-face meetings, to competently manage external funding for projects appropriate to its organizational capability, and to control what goes on with regard to natural resources within the territory. The organization has a community-

[8] Of course, for biodiversity purposes it might be good to go back to the pre-conquest state in Amazonia in the way some groups still insist on doing, albeit in a somewhat artificially constructed way. Some Waorani (originally under headman Taga and thus called the Tagaeri) and others who have maintained voluntary isolation since the 1940s, seem to be pretty serious about protecting habitat. They tend to kill other would-be appropriators.

appointed non-elected governing council that does not change personnel with elections and whose guidance survives changes in leadership.

6. Each group has quality bilingual primary education plus access and financial support for culturally appropriate secondary and post-secondary education for those members who qualify on the basis of capability and motivation. Educational opportunities permit either vocational/technical or academic tracks and are offered as close to the territory as possible. An indigenous university of the kind the Miskitu have in Bluefields, Nicaragua (private) or URACCAN University in Nicaragua in several locations (public) might be the model for higher education. USAID might consider supporting and guiding the development of the indigenous university Ecuador has begun.

7. Each group has access to the health services provided by the state to its non-indigenous citizens who live in cities. Local healthcare is culturally appropriate and furnished by professionals who are versed in the language and culture of the people being treated.

Parts of this ideal state of affairs are not subject to the actions of bilateral or multilateral donors, at least at the present state of international financing for poverty, education, and health. While one might question international priorities in this regard, all we can do is try to use the funds available in the most efficient way possible. Section III discusses some of these efficiency issues.

SECTION III – OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

The guidelines that follow are the products of both experience and theory. They may be taken as the guideposts along the road to the ideal state of affairs as presented above.

Working with probabilities rather than certainties and understanding how culture works

Development is not chemistry or physics and no one can guarantee the outcome of a long and complex cultural process. Experience of the past can sometimes be a predictor of the future, but not always. We live with the weight and trajectory of our history, but we also live in history. This means that while tradition plays a huge part in cultural affairs, we constantly react cognitively to our own constructions of history and use the constructions to influence actions in the present and the possibilities for the future. We move through this stream of time closing some doors to the future as we open others. This being said, there is some order to culture which is, after all, designed through biological evolution for the purposes of rapid and flexible adaptation to physical or political realities as they present themselves.

We can think of cultural systems universally as consisting of three levels of organization [9] which – without becoming overly technical – might be termed, 1) the economic base[10], 2) the level of social organization and, 3) the ideological system that importantly includes values. "Natural" culture change tends to proceed from the bottom to the top over time. An example would be the long process of slow demographic growth intersecting with post-Pleistocene warming that resulted in humans producing their own food and all the changes in organization and ideology that were set into motion by those changes.

Introduced changes, in order to be most effective, should mimic the "natural" processes. Changes in the economic base, a change in technology, for example, such as the introduction of the cell phone – probabilistically demanded changes in human organization which allowed and elicited different ways of conceiving and valuing relationships and in the ways identity is expressed. In terms of the aims of programs such as CAIMAN that seek to strengthen indigenous organization and consolidate the land base – changes to the economic base will probably elicit adaptive changes in levels two and three. As an example, CAIMAN's work with markets for handicrafts has caused changes in the ways that indigenous groups organize, particularly with regard to women. These changes in organization will probably eventually be rationalized ideologically, one hopes with an ideology that supports sustainable resource use and that favors the environmentally conservative views of women.

The flow of change does not work the same way in reverse. One can think – and many have thought – of new kinds of values that would revolutionize social organization (we could, for instance all begin to value community or respect age) or that would revolutionize a technology and have found that they do not take root, often because they encounter resistance from entrenched interests (existing social and economic organization) or that they are not compatible with the existing economic system.

In other words, the probability of adaptive change is great if change is introduced from below (change in the economic/technological/demographic base) and much less if one merely tries to teach new ideas with the hope that these ideas will

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[9] Harris M. 1979. Cultural *Materialism: The Struggle for a Science of Culture*. New York: Random House. Also, for illustrative cases (there are many) see Harris' classic, India's Sacred Cow. *In* Anthropology: Contemporary Perspectives, 8th Edition. Phillip Whitten, ed. Pp. 229-233. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. (2001) and Stocks A. 1987 Resource Management in an Amazon *Varzea* Lake Ecosystem. *In* The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources. Bonnie J. McCay and James M. Acheson, eds. Pp. 108-120. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press.

[10] The economic base includes whatever people have to do to make a living, the ecosystems that they depend on to do so, their population characteristics, and the technology they use. Changes in any of these factors will elicit changes in organization and changes in values.

convince people to change the economic base or the ways in which they organize.

There is also another sense in which conservation is something of a probabilistic crapshoot where one can juggle the odds but not be sure of the outcome. It is that indigenous communities, like most communities, are not solidary but represent a diversity of opinions in a small physical space. While some people in a community might favor the immediate sale of everything that has a market value – perhaps because their own livelihood strategy does not involve longer term residence – other people take a longer term and more sustainable point of view. The actions we take should attempt to favor these more conservative ideological currents, but in the end we cannot be certain that the outcome will be exactly what we want.

Affecting economy, social organization, and ideological currents at once

This guideline feeds on the explanations above. To repeat, changes made in the economic base have a better chance of influencing changes in social organization and what people think. The ideal development intervention changes something in the economic base and reinforces that change by **facilitating** the necessary changes in organization and introducing ideas that will support the basic economic change. Thus, consolidation of indigenous land tenure (a change in the economic base) should be accompanied by helping indigenous institutions be better land administrators. It should also be accompanied by training in concepts and techniques that will reinforce the other two levels of intervention. It seems to me that CAIMAN has discerned this.

Working from the bottom up, while not ignoring policy and legal frameworks

The best interventions are participatory in nature. This much-abused term has acquired a number of meanings and a substantial literature, but I mean by it a process in which people living in an area define a problem, define solutions, and carry on – to the best of their capacity – the work it takes to arrive at those solutions. This process can be facilitated by embedding an individual or individuals – with the necessary social and language skills and technical understanding of what needs to be done – in, or close by, a community or group of communities in order to understand how they live, what they want to do (that is at least close to the interest of the organization involved), and what the constraints are on carrying out the process of doing it. The technical person then offers technical assistance to facilitate the social and cultural process and nurtures the process along the way. Each party has its own goals and there must be an explicit recognition that the aims of the facilitators are not identical to, but strongly overlap with, the goals of the people. Generally in biodiversity conservation with tropical forest people, the overlap is the following: the technical facilitator is immersed in the discourse about the abstract value of biodiversity, ecological processes, and perhaps cultural survival, whereas the indigenous

people are immersed in a discourse about protecting their ancestral lands from other appropriators and about cultural autonomy. They also tend strongly to recognize that it would be very good not to run out of resources, thus depriving one's great-great- grandchildren of a living. Mutual interests identified, the process becomes field-driven in the sense that the job of the home base is to respond to the needs of the field process as it develops and to help remove constraints.

The last phrase is critical. One of the comparative advantages of USAID in development is that it is part of the foreign policy institution of the United States. As a bilateral donor, USAID has the potential to affect the policy and legal environment in which its projects develop. In the case of biodiversity conservation, as we shall see below, this may involve affecting the legal framework under which the land of Ecuador's lowland indigenous groups is held and perhaps affecting aspects of the protected areas laws to better structure the relations between indigenous groups and protected areas for long-term biodiversity conservation. USAID also has great influence in convoking a number of actors from all sectors together to discuss and advise on needed policy and legal change. While such power should not be used injudiciously, it should also not be ignored.

Keeping Low to the Ground

When working with lowland indigenous groups, the best training is often training in-context and on-the-ground. Emphasizing bottom-up and participatory processes naturally shifts the focus from the capital to the community or groups of communities. One of the principal problems of training in capital cities – although it can be avoided if the trainers know the culture and language of the trainees (as in the case of the FSC and the Cofán) – is that external training groups tend to represent ideological systems that may be quite at odds with indigenous cultures and therefore unconsciously carry on training that is ethnocentric and not applicable at local levels. We think particularly in this case of such things as out-of-context "leadership" or "administrative" training that may not be terribly applicable to the cultural context of the trainees. Out-of-context training also runs the risk of assuming an organizational structure on the ground that does not exist. Attempting to put into practice some of the lessons learned may quickly exceed the organizational and operational abilities of indigenous groups.

Selecting Partners

One challenge of the future for USAID in biodiversity conservation with potentially reduced resources is to move support closer to the groups directly interacting with natural resources. In some cases it may even involve interacting with indigenous organizations themselves without NGO intermediation between donor and executor. This challenge recognizes the very good work done in the past by international NGOs in developing technical people, national conservation

organizations and local constituencies for conservation in countries like Ecuador. The future approach enjoins the large BINGOS (Big International NGOs to use Mac Chapin's pithy term) to partially work themselves out of a job, so to speak. BINGOS, in this scenario, take to the sidelines and provide guidance and technical or scientific support when it is requested. Many groups – TNC is an example – have been increasingly willing to commit more of their enormous endowments to international conservation than they were in the past. They can also be extremely useful in helping to set up long-term financing for conservation initiatives because they have the most experience in this area. The economic efficiencies and direct conservation gains supported by this approach are significant.

The key question, of course, is with which national, regional, or local groups should USAID work. Recommendations will be made later in this document about a few of the possibilities identified in the course of the study. These possibilities are not exhaustive so it is useful to make more general guideline suggestions here. In that spirit, it seems wise to point out that some conservation-minded national and regional NGOs that work with indigenous people have backing from permanently-established institutions in the country and are the external representatives of the long-term programs of those institutions. A good example would be the relationship between the Salesians and the Fundación Chankuap in Macas or, in the same area, the relationship between the Salesians and their technical colegio. In the northeast there is the relationship between the Fondo Ecuatoriano Popularum Progresio (FEPP) and the conference of Catholic bishops (Conferencia Episcopal). Such institutions – assuming they come well-recommended by the people with whom they work and can qualify to work with USAID accounting and reporting requirements – can provide a valuable synergy that makes conservation dollars stretch and capitalizes on long-term commitment, deep knowledge of regions and peoples, and the ability to leverage parallel or counterpart funds to generate or administer effective projects with the people with whom they work. Rather than a contracting mode, such institutions can possibly handle cooperative agreements with substantial counterpart requirements.

This observation tends to stress the difference between organizations that have programs and those that merely have projects. This is an important distinction heuristically, although one recognizes that there is a range here and not a dichotomy. On one end of the spectrum are institutions with long-term programs with often modest but firm goals and who have spent many years developing staff and know-how. On the other end are institutions that live exclusively from projects and tend to take on any task that a donor wants done regardless of their technical or scientific depth to do so. In general, one prefers institutions that have long-term physical presence in the area of their work, those with as-close-to-participatory methodologies as possible (under our description above), those who have technical people who **speak the language** of the people with whom they work, and those with an established track record of success.

In many ways the success of indigenous organizations will lie in the same distinction between programs and projects. A successful organization will have a program based on a strategic plan that sets the long-term goals and looks after the general methods and techniques of the organization to achieve those goals. This program function should be stably funded and should have a few technical people not subject to election as well as an elected executive. The organization then can be complemented with projects which are funded by soft money and whose personnel will respond to the general thrust of the program while executing specific program-related projects.

Over the past 10-15 years in Ecuador, there has been a general disillusionment over the possibilities of directly funding indigenous organizations[11]. The many interviews we have had with actors directly related to the field have revealed a general sense that throwing large amounts of money at indigenous organizations has not helped to strengthen them. In an often-cited case, the Waorani organization is given direct donations, while their constituencies are encouraged to form direct patrón-client relations with certain oil companies. The practice has the effect of undermining ONHAE authority while diverting the organization's attention to projects beyond their organizational abilities. In the field, Waorani communities who are offered benefits that thoughtlessly mimic the culture of the invaders (such as television) tend to lose the mutually-supportive relationship with the green space they inhabit.[12] In the most recent case, it was (perhaps fictitiously) reported in a FLACSO seminar that an oil company offered ONHAE $1.3m/per year to drop their objections to their operations. In the same way, the Secoya organization, OISE, is said to be severely undermined and corrupted by a donation a few years ago of $700,000 by oil interests (advised by anthropologists who should have known better) in a negotiation quite separate from their original code of conduct and financial agreement. This damage, however, is probably of limited duration because of the close-knit nature of the small (300 people) ethnic group and because they have long ago learned how to deal with the outside. Spending the money was probably more in the nature of a spree from which one quickly recovers.

Few among the oil interests, the green interests, and the indigenous thinkers themselves seem to be willing to negotiate through the complexities of the negative synergy created by the combination of colonization and spontaneous development and deforestation through oil road networks, and the chaos of

[11] The disillusionment extends to some, not all, of the oil interests. There are still companies that continue to shower cash and other blandishments on indigenous communities and individuals with little regard for the gradual development of indigenous management capacity. However, there are also companies that have a longer range vision and more developed methodologies.

[12] Surely, it would be possible to design culturally appropriate modes of support for health and education that would ease the transition and maintain the green connection if it were done thoughtfully. However, this might require that oil camps more resemble Waorani camps or perhaps entail some very expensive commuting. In any case, it is interesting that only the Waorani are expected to culturally adjust, not the industries that interact with them.

jurisdiction between parks, oil blocks and indigenous claims that has created the Waorani situation. In Ecuador, the response by some who have other interests in Waorani territory (including the Yasuni National Park) to the Waorani "crisis" is not a major movement to regulate the interactions of the various parties impinging on Waorani green space and to ease the pain of the transition in which only the Waorani are supposed to be flexible, i.e., address some of the causes of the problem, but rather to accuse the Waorani of over-hunting and selling forest resources on the market. Unfortunately, many Waorani, disoriented by the plethora of interests in their land with dollars in their pockets, have also lost their way. The women seem a bit more resistant to the blandishments than the men, a behavior which is not unusual in indigenous cultural life. The selective forces of culture seem to be most heavily felt by men who adapt relatively quickly to economic or political external pressures. The deeper cultural business of raising children and maintaining the inner structures of cultural coherency seem to fall to women and they tend to be more distrustful than men of rapid change.

As in the case of failed or nearly failed states, the only path forward with indigenous organizations is to avoid blaming them for their own troubles and to continue the contact, but to work more intelligently (i.e., in accordance with the way culture actually works and in more participatory ways that draw on indigenous knowledge of their own situation and the solutions to problems they perceive) to support them for a stronger future. Biodiversity protection and our own interest in human rights dictate this path. Later in this report, there will be some specific suggestions for institutional strengthening of indigenous organizations.

Throwing money at indigenous organizational problems

A problem that has interested anthropologists for over 100 years is the process by which people living in societies that are kin-based with relatively flat hierarchies and reciprocal economies (referred to by anthropologists as "egalitarian" groups) managed to evolve hierarchical non-kin-based societies with monetarized market and redistributive economies.[13] These are the polar ranges of the human condition and people culturally conditioned by either pole have great difficulty in understanding each other.

In the case of Ecuador, the Amazonian and Pacific lowland indigenous groups fall to one degree or another on the more egalitarian side of the spectrum. In theory (remember cultural materialist theory discussed above) their own cultural changes will depend on the material conditions of their existence. Their

[13] The evolution seems to have occurred as a political response to the demographic and ecological changes occasioned by the end of the Pleistocene which plunged humans into a much sharper competition for natural resources. The desperate rapid evolution of food production, in turn, plunged us into an intense spiral of rapid population growth and increased violence and appropriation which has not abated in the last 8,000 years.

organizations exist, at this point, to advocate for them in the way that a political action committee in the United States represents the interests of its members to higher levels of authority. The mere existence of these organizations is, to some degree, a contradiction with the lives of their members in the field, but they represent a first stage in the transition to cultural forms that can survive sustained contact with us. Attempts to convert these organizations into **managerial** institutions or entrepreneurial institutions by the rapid infusion of money has the effect of coöpting and corrupting them, making them less representative and undermining their authority within the polities they purport to represent. It is much better to let them perform their "natural" functions while cautiously experimenting with projects that require only low levels of organizational capacity. That being said, some organizations, such as the Achuar and Shuar organizations have had over a half-century of institutional strengthening and may now be ready for some direct donor support, keeping in mind that their relations with their own political bases may still be shaky. Both organizations have already entered into such relations with some donors.

Strengthening Indigenous Institutions

Another problem with trying to move indigenous organizations faster than they are capable of moving by infusions of money for projects is the tendency for groups that are receiving more funding than they can absorb to marginalize the older people who are the fundamental authority in most indigenous village life. Even without higher levels of funding, there has been a tendency all over Latin America for indigenous groups to be represented by younger Spanish-speaking leaders who, unfortunately, may have the least commitment to the cultural values that are compatible with biodiversity conservation. Even within communities, in many cases, older people who do not speak Spanish are silenced at any level above the family. Ways must be found to support these elder voices, both men and women, to continue to counterbalance the flow of power to the young. Most indigenous organizations have a "governing council" and one of the serious weaknesses of many of these is that they are composed of annually or semi-annually elected political representatives, often community "presidents" that are the local equivalent of the federation leaders, e.g., young, male, fluent in Spanish, little commitment to the past. The construction and function of this governing body should be the subject of much analysis. It needs to be composed of long-term members, older people as well as younger, men as well as women, with representation of the various geographic divisions of the ethnic group. The members should be nominated by communities for "permanent" membership with some statutory means of replacing them on the basis of performance or death. They must be the ultimate authority over the federation and meetings of the governing council must be facilitated in the same way that federations are supported. Within the federations themselves, of course, administrative issues, transparency and culturally appropriate strategic planning remain the appropriate focus for funding.

Danger Signals

How can one know when funding for indigenous organizations has exceeded their capacity to use them productively? Many projects ask for proposals and timelines, then advance funds to indigenous organizations and demand receipts and reports while remaining at something of a distance from the technical activities. Some projects agree on a set of fundable categories and a financial ceiling and then provide funds according to the receipts that are submitted. The second method allows more flexibility in terms of the rhythm of the activities that are funded. Both methods fail in a participatory sense and in the sense of insuring that the indigenous organization is strengthened through the funding and not weakened. Remember that indigenous organizations do not come into being because of their ability to execute projects. They come into being as avenues for the expression of unrest, ways in which communities and individuals can have a voice to authorities and other outsiders. They appear to be hierarchical only because “leaders” are needed to provide a voice. Initial funding should concentrate on facilitating this voice and on insuring that there is strong communication with the base.

When donors respond to a request from an indigenous organization to execute a project, or suggest a project that could be executed, the action essentially asks the indigenous organization to become a hierarchical bureaucracy. This is quite a different sort of social organism, one directed from the top, rather than from the bottom and it takes long development to achieve this change. In the course of doing so, it is well to remember that organizational capacity is not merely the appearance of a bureaucracy, but rather is built through the accumulation of social capital. In turn, social capital is generated by relations of trust and confidence that ordinary people have in their organization. Thus, insuring success requires monitoring the social capital generated by a funded project.

While overloading of institutional capacity may be detected through attenuation in the flow or quality of receipts, this is a poor index at best. There is no real substitute for having a person on the ground who knows the culture and speaks the language (or is making an honest effort to learn it) to gauge participation, address problems, keep track of community opinion, and the progress of technical activities and make connections when they are needed. Whether this person handles funds directly or simply acts as a facilitator and mine canary, it is indispensable to maintain close contact with field activities as they impact communities and individuals. The danger signs of overloading have to do with communication, progress and dependability as viewed by the beneficiaries, not necessarily the indigenous organization receiving the funding. These are social signals and are not detected through a set of receipts. Nor are they easily detected through a series of “parachute” visits by the donors.

Thus, there is no set amount of funding that can be specified as “dangerous to the health” of an indigenous organization. Each one is different and each one has

different capacities. When funds fail to achieve their purpose of generating social capital, then is when the problems begin.

Estimating time frames for success

No work in institutional strengthening of indigenous organizations or biodiversity conservation takes place quickly. It is better to think generationally than in terms of project life. While stable funding (i.e., endowments) can be accomplished within a project life-span, the longer term goals cannot. For goals that involve the issues discussed in this report what is required is a strategic mix of short-term funding to get the ball rolling (pardon the bowling metaphor) and long-term funding to insure that the ball does not hit the gutter the minute the project is over. In the case of the SUBIR project, the lack of long-term funding was probably one of the fundamental design flaws. CAIMAN has the goal of long-term funding clearly stated as one of the three pillars of the project, but has encountered different levels of development in each organization, weak leaderships, etc. that needed to be addressed before attention went into identifying the sources and constructing of financial sustainable mechanisms and it seems that it will take some time for this long-term funding be in placed. The conservation BINGOS, experienced in the development of sustainable financial mechanism should be explored to address this area in the future.

It is well to remember that measurements of success of biodiversity conservation also take place in time frames that are longer than projects. In the recent case of indigenous territorial titles in Nicaragua's BOSAWAS biosphere reserve and the monitoring evidence that indigenous people have established a supportive relationship with both the flora and the fauna, the success took place 8 years after the 4 year project ended at a time when the USAID staff in Nicaragua (and apparently TNC headquarters in Arlington) had no institutional memory of having ever supported the project. In another case, much of the upper Xingú River in Brazil is now considered to be relatively well protected and is home to indigenous groups of nine different language families. The original vision of the Vilas Boas brothers took place two generations ago but they were savvy enough to involve mechanisms of institutional program support beyond the project. Our institutional lives are short, but life goes on in the forest continuously, or so we hope.

Pursuing Income Strategies

As pointed out in Section II, the ideal income strategies for the goals of long-term green stewardship by indigenous people involve activities that are directly related to protection of green areas, commercial exploitation of the fact that they are green, replacement of specific foods that are foregone by the exercise of self-control over hunting and/or fishing activities, exploitation of natural resources in managed and sustainable ways and which, as in the case of indigenous handicrafts, tend to support the conservative ideologies of women as well as those of men, or the provision of essential up-to-date services to communities

who voluntarily reside in green areas and participate in keeping the place green.[14]

Keeping our eyes on this principle would indicate the risks in supporting mere income-raising activities such as cacao production, the subsidized sale of agricultural projects, and income-related agroforestry projects as parts of our long-term strategy for biodiversity conservation through indigenous control. While it would be interesting to do a study that compares the conservation outcomes of income strategies divided along the lines I have indicated (directly related to conservation vs. income alone), to my knowledge no such rigorous comparison has been done. What is often argued is that in forest frontiers, there is often an inverse relation between income levels, particularly from agricultural activities, and deforestation which should make us cautious about which activities we support[15].

The second aspect of income strategies is to beware of income projects that assume a market that does not currently exist or that "needs development." There are few cases of success in this realm in the NGO community, although there are a number of successes in linking indigenous products to international markets that already exist, but in which retailers can gain a cultural or green "niche" by dealing with fair trade organizations or even, as in the case of chuchuhuasa and ungurahua oil, in the national market without any cultural or green spin. The Chankuap Foundation in Macas is deeply involved in some of these markets in Italy and Quito and Sinchi Sacha seems to have developed a very good niche for handicraft art in Quito without being involved in international trade. Jason Clay, formerly of Cultural Survival Enterprises and now with WWF in Washington DC, is a leading U.S. expert on this subject if consultation is needed. Cultural Survival Enterprises in Cambridge has established an interesting

[14] This would have been a very wise thing for the oil companies to have instituted from the first, i.e., a continuous monitoring of the state of natural resources in areas of their influence and the conditioning of certain kinds or levels of community assistance on the maintenance of biodiversity, a variation on the conservation direct payments advocated by Paul Ferraro and his followers. For the reference, google Paul Ferraro (Univ. of Georgia) Richard Rice (CI), or "conservation payments) or for better access to significant studies, join the AAAS and keyword any of the above on the online *Science* search engine in their archives which have become a potent source for threaded arguments.

[15] This subject has been widely discussed. Especially consult Angelsen, Arild, and Kaimowitz, David, eds. 2001. *Agricultural Technologies and tropical Deforestation.* Jakarta: CIFOR (Center for International Forestry Research). It has an excellent bibliography of case studies. Another earlier source by the same authors with more equivocal data (see p. 18 for major conclusions and table 5 on p. 44 for some of the variation) is Angelsen, Arild, and Kaimowitz, David. 1998 *Economic Models of Tropical Deforestation: A Review.* Jakarta: CIFOR. It would seem that the later book resolved a few of the doubts expressed in the 1998 volume. Also for an interesting case, see Farris, Robert. 1999. Deforestation and Land Use on the Evolving Frontier: An Empirical Assessment. MS, Harvard-INCAE-BCIE Paper, Central America Project. One notes, however, that studies such as Farris´ do not often compare mestizos with indigenous people in the same context.

relationship with the British firm, The Body Shop similar to the relationship Chankuap has in Italy for some of the Gé groups in Brazil.

A third aspect of income strategies is to beware of activities that assume a great deal of government presence or government control in order to be successful. I think particularly of the CAIMAN support for the Center for Forest Transformation (CTF) in Awá country and the CARE support for the Shuar Local Association of Forest Technicians through Jatun Sacha in Macas. Costs for green forestry are higher than costs for rip and run forestry and the market has to distinguish between legal and illegal wood or, in the case of FSC green certification, between managed and non-managed sources to make it pay. The certified market is only useful if the organization has enough volume to deal directly with a European market (certification can be the price of entry) or with a large retailer like Home Depot.

The activity of commercial logging in Ecuador seems to have little government oversight; indeed there is evidence from the crippling of the monitoring ability of the MAE that it may be some time before control exists again. And the pressure for logging national forests with resident indigenous communities is great. Data from the plywood industry indicate that only about 15% of their supply of trees can be found in their own plantations and another 15% from the lands of private smallholders. This means that the other 70% must come from national forests occupied ancestrally or otherwise by communities that may or may not have titles. Furthermore, the average quality of wood from the national forests is higher than the quality of the plantations or the smallholder managed plots, which means that they are the *preferred* source, thus accounting for the extreme pressure on indigenous communities with holdings in national forests.

While property owners who pay the local Shuar technicians to do management plans and assist with extraction and marketing can make a profit (assuming the data we saw are correct, and given that they did not include the costs of training the technicians in the cost of production which we may think of as the "development subsidy"), they can make more money selling wood directly to loggers. Their incentive for dealing with the technicians depends on the "social capital" that one hopes occurs when a green alternative is offered within an ethnolinguistic group that publicly stresses their "greenness."

The same is true of the willingness of Awá individuals and communities to wait for the development of the CTF to sell trees. A good deal of social capital is required for forbearance and that capital may be eroding. Obviously one solution would be found if USAID were supporting a number of other publicly acknowledged much-needed services with the Awá, such that support could be conditioned on maintenance of biodiversity and support for the organizational goals of FCAE, a kind of direct conservation payment through services. This would be an expensive solution. However, <u>some</u> way of benefiting all Awá communities through FCAE might be the price of CTF development before

community support erodes. One wonders if an Awá radio station in San Lorenzo might be a good way to spend the $500,000 that the IBD has for this purpose.[16] After having said all that, the CTF might be one of those subsidies that USAID should be frank about considering without expecting that the operation is suddenly going to turn into a money mill or that it will provide economic relief for more than a small fraction of the Awá communities. It may be worth doing simply to provide a model that advances the idea of indigenous forest management as an alternative to selling trees

Much relating to the point below has been discussed earlier in this report. However, it is probably worth reiterating that lowland Amazonian or Pacific indigenous organization is, to some degree, an oxymoron if we take the term 'organization' in this case to mean an institution capable of entrepreneurial projects informed by the ideology and operations of typical capitalist institutions. Income projects should generally be low-tech, low pressure, easily understandable by the participants, family-oriented, and of a nature that success is not totally dependent on fragile technological links or long processes that involve huge amounts of patience while social capital erodes. As an ideal kind of project I have seen in Ecuador, the stimulation of family (or even larger) aquaculture with native species does not exceed organizational capacity or require high degrees of technological skill. It also meets the criteria of being directly related to conservation and can provide some income as well. The marketing of handicrafts is also something the organizations seem able to do, although it is wise to put up a firewall between marketing operations and the political organization itself, something I don't see in very many cases here in Ecuador. The Awá organization seems to have the maturity to handle the CTF, although the technology may not be replaceable under their own financing when it breaks down, and they haven't yet had to undertake their own marketing. FEINCE clearly is not quite ready to take on the marketing of bamboo in Lago Agrio. They lack even a 'dirigente' of marketing in their organizational structure and the top three positions are busy with other things.

Administrative Training

Aside from marketing, the organizational capacity for administration and financial reporting is normally the weakest link in an indigenous organization. Training for this function of institutional strengthening is best done within the local context, not through workshops, but through day to day working through the problems of what to do with this receipt, that bank statement, this donor-reporting requirement. At the local level, the theoretical lessons learned in the capital often become meaningless as a guide about what to do next. Theory doesn't help when an administrator's child is sick and money is needed to pay for the medicine or when the president of the organization demands some off-the-books financial support from the treasurer who is her/his uncle. In terms of organizational strengthening it is also best to do leadership training and strategic

[16] Talk to Steve Stone at the IBD about this money.

planning training in context. However, the trainees in business planning whose projects I listened to in Quito may have found a useful combination of reality and theory. It will be interesting to see CAIMAN's evaluation of that training if it bears fruit.

Complex Chains of Development

In general, processes in indigenous areas work best if they are relatively low technology, and sustainable with inputs available to local people when the learning phase is over. They should respond to specific needs identified by the people themselves. When there are vulnerable links such as complex machinery, dependence on relationships established through more than one external link, vulnerability because of jurisdictional issues that remain unresolved while other activities that depend on secure jurisdiction proceed, or depend on the actions of an external agency over which the indigenous people have little input or control, the final result will tend not to resist perturbations. A glance back at the history of integrated conservation and development projects will tell us that the only valid prediction for future conditions is their unpredictability. Sustainability comes through responding to real – not imagined – needs, organic roots in organizational levels that are not invented for the purpose of the development exercise, simplicity, direct relationships to the conservation goal, and relative independence from hard-to-attain or expensive outside inputs.

SECTION IV – RECOMMENDATIONS

IV.A. The Legal And Policy Framework

A1. Territorial Circumscription

Ecuador lacks a law that would allow Amazonian indigenous ethnic groups to claim ancestral lands as inalienable territories in compliance with the guarantees of the constitution and ILO treaty 169 which Ecuador has signed and ratified. The various modalities of holding indigenous land such as ancestral possession under the forest law, centros or communes under agrarian reform, agreements for use and possession, etc. do not allow for territorial circumscription as a single polygon in the name of the ethnic group with a clear title to the land.[17] Ecuador is the only Andean country that that lacks a legal framework to title lands to ethnic groups and every lowland group in the Amazon or Pacific side would like to see progress in this matter. In a recent study published by the World Bank, Roque Roldán[18], an expert on the legal issues has this to say and it is worth quoting extensively:

> …the Ecuadorian constitution uses the future tense to refer to indigenous [land] rights which seems to imply that further action by the

[17] In the case of the Cofán, Chachi and Secoya, there would be more than one polygon.

[18] Roque Roldán. 2005. Models for Recognizing Indigenous Land Rights in Latin America. World Bank Environment Department Papers, Biodiversity Series.

national legislature is necessary in order to fully establish those rights. Even before approving the constitution, Ecuador managed to regularize a significant extension of indigenous lands utilizing the existing system of agrarian legislation. Because of the lack of specific indigenous procedures, these lands were titled not to legally-recognized ethnic groups, but rather by using whatever organization, or lack of organization, the groups had at the moment the titles were granted. Thus, indigenous lands have been titled to individuals, cooperatives, centers or associations of centers (Centers are an organizational form introduced by religious missionaries among some indigenous groups), communes (a legal figure established by several laws in 1937, characterized by communal ownership), and ethnic territories. The only one of these that has any relationship to the indigenous tradition is the commune, but this was only used in the Andes, not the Amazon where the vast majority of titled lands was located. The lack of legal norms associated with the titled entities led to the application of the Civil Code provisions for communal property being applied to these titles. While the new Constitution says that indigenous lands are inalienable and cannot enter into the free market in property, it appears to require that the characteristic of inalienability be granted through a subsequent law passed by the legislature, such that all the lands that have been titled would need an additional legal action in order to become inalienable. As can be seen from this analysis, the Ecuadorian legislature urgently needs to issue the laws necessary to support the constitutional declarations on indigenous rights, including not only the specification of an appropriate procedure for titling indigenous lands, but also a legal framework for the incorporation of indigenous groups and a model for land management after lands are titled to those groups.

A draft law has been considered by the Ecuadorian Congress, but failed to be passed into law. It will surely be introduced again within the near future. Additionally, as a result of a historic decision by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) in 2001, there is now an international legal precedent in which a Latin American nation (Nicaragua) was held to be in violation of the human rights of an indigenous people[19] by not having a legal framework by which they could claim their historic land rights as guaranteed by their constitution and (in this case only) the law granting political autonomy to the Atlantic Coast. Nicaragua has not signed ILO 169, but the nation agreed to comply with the court decision, has passed an indigenous land law, and has now titled over 600,00 hectares to five indigenous territories in an international biosphere reserve. It will not be long before Ecuador is in court over the issue.

What should USAID do?

[19] Google “Awas Tingni” and look for the law school page of the University of Arizona to find the full text of the decision.

- Brief the Embassy on the issue
- Provide cautious support[20] once indigenous people have taken the initiative and the legal project has been re-introduced.
- Support should be channeled through the official government indigenous institution, CONDENPE (Consejo de Nacionalidades y Pueblos del Ecuador).

A2. Sistema Nacional de Areas Protegidas (SNAP)

An intermediate step toward more secure land rights for Amazonians and Pacific lowland indigenous groups would be if SNAP legislation were altered in order to allow land titles to indigenous groups in the system. ECOLEX argues that, as the constitutional guarantees over indigenous land is prior to the SNAP legislation, the SNAP legislation removes a right guaranteed by the constitution. This is an interesting and possibly productive point of view and ECOLEX should probably be supported to make that argument.

There is already a consensus building that indigenous co-management of protected areas makes sense in several cases, and in the case of the Cofán-Bermejo reserve, the precedent has already been set. This is an interesting intermediate step and should be considered as such. The strategy would then be the following: 1) co-management of protected areas, 2) titles in protected areas 3) territorial circumscription and administration.

A3. National ombudsman for indigenous issues

Currently there is no national ombudsman for indigenous issues. Indigenous people who wish to bring a complaint or seek support for specific matters are confronted with a plethora of government offices ranging from the MAE to the Procurador to CONDENPE. A national ombudsman's office could simplify things enormously by addressing the issues brought to the office and channeling them to the appropriate agency, or arranging a personal visit, to deal with the problem.

[20] Caution is required in order to avoid a repeat of the political brouhaha centering on the Biodiversity Law in which the national indigenous NGO, CONAIE, opposed it even though it would have permitted indigenous titles within protected areas, largely on the grounds that the U.S. supported it and thus it must be a plot to implement free trade and the Andean Pact at the expense of indigenous people. USAID should insure that the legislation has the explicit support of the lower level indigenous organizations before any financial support is offered.

A4. Enforcement of existing laws and regulations

This suggestion is essentially empty, as virtually everyone we interviewed during the course of this consultancy pointed out certain weaknesses in government presence in some of the most critical issues in the nation. In our limited scoping of political issues related to indigenous matters and biodiversity, from the hydrocarbon companies to the NGOs to the indigenous organizations, and even to the legitimate forest industry, most people would like to see government monitoring and serious enforcement of the protected area laws and the laws regarding forest extraction. The existing system is characterized by a host of rules and regulations that are observed only in the breach, a situation in which organizations and individuals have to operate outside the law in order to survive. However, it seems unlikely that throwing money at this problem would work – even for donors who could directly fund government operations – because the problem is deeply rooted in a political economy that many view as placing a very low priority on the public good. Changing this pattern from the top (supply side) is probably not within the reach of USAID. What will eventually change it is the demand for better governance from the public.

A5. Yasuni National Park/Hydrocarbons/Waorani Policy

A panel discussion at FLACSO on July 26, 2005 revealed deep public and private concerns and contradictions regarding the park, the people, and the industry. From certain things said in the discussion and from other sources, it seems that the GAT (Grupo Asesor Técnico), given sufficient funding through oil companies, may have plans to assume co-management authority in the park if the national protected areas system evolves regulations in that direction, a change which seems likely. There is no consensus whatever on what to do. It also seems that the GAT fund-raising plan may be a stillbirth.

One thing obvious to an outsider is that the situation places the most vulnerable indigenous society in Ecuador in a position where they are dealing directly with a number of different oil companies with little refereeing on the playing field and with insufficient organization and acculturation to western patterns to scope out their own development needs in a way that would be cumulative, coherent, and consistent. The companies, while they may have divisions of community relations, are in Ecuador to make a profit and not for the purpose of developing indigenous organizations and, given the different stages of development of each company and the somewhat chaotic nature of oil capitalism in which companies only average 4-6 years before ownership changes, it is hardly reasonable to expect them to come up with a coherent and agreed-upon social program that would leave the Waorani organizationally and culturally stronger when the oil finally runs out in 30 years or so. The situation is further complicated by the ambiguous requirement of the government that companies must “consult” their plans with affected groups and communities. While “permission” to conduct operations is not legally required, the consult rules make it possible for

communities and organizations to put a price on their cooperation through direct negotiation with the companies under the threat of disrupting their operations. Given the disorganized nature of Waorani society, cooperation is erratic, the locus of requests and demands shifts from day to day, and prices vary widely. Two oil companies interviewed claim to spend from $1m to $1.5m each year on community "development."

Perhaps not surprisingly, there seems to be some opening from the oil companies themselves who might welcome, and contribute to, some coherent plan. The companies may be tiring of what they view as incessant and uncoordinated demands for money from communities, ethnic organizations, parroquias, municipalities, provinces, and, of course, the central government which recently added the IVA tax to the rest of the taxes and fees charged to the industry. Ecuador's dependence on hydrocarbon revenues from outsiders is said to be a function of the lack of investment of Ecuador in its own production system.

The most difficult part of a solution perhaps will be the evolution of a relationship between ONHAE (or its successor) and the Waorani communities such that they are willing to use the organization as their negotiating tool and are willing to contribute to a common planning process for their future. Speaking of these changes in these terms makes one humble, because we are speaking of an organizational culture toward which only the smallest of steps have been taken. Nevertheless we need a long-term goal.

What should USAID do within the scope of biodiversity conservation through support for indigenous control over green areas?

- Follow the suggestions regarding support for changes in the overall legal context of indigenous territorial circumscription and the steps leading toward that goal.
- Use USAID´s power of convocation to broaden and intensify the discussion regarding the Waorani/Industry/Conservation/Park Management issues. Try to involve all the companies involved in the park and encourage them to talk to each other about how to work more cheaply and efficiently in their social programs by cooperating. Ideally, USAID should participate in a stable financial solution to the park management issue in cooperation with the oil companies, institutions belonging to the GAT, perhaps the Fondo Ambiental Nacional and perhaps CODENPE. Given stable funding, one of the players should assume the co-management of the park and encourage the Waorani to take a greater role even before the policy framework for indigenous territorial titles develops. There should be an advisory board for the park, but it should be a more comprehensive set of interests than the interests evidenced at this point by the GAT itself.
- The same set of actors should discuss setting up a Waorani stabilization fund that would provide a level and steady source of support for ONHAE

officers and core operations. This fund would be separate from the fund suggested under Organizational Recommendations below and would be administered by one of the actors, involved in the discussions.

- Support the development of a common code of ethical conduct between the actors to which all parties can agree. This code of conduct should minimally begin with Waorani/Industry, Waorani/Park, Park/Industry relations and perhaps be broadened to include the relations of colonist and native Kichwa communities to all of these actors.
- Support the mobilization of some civic actor, respected by all parties, to monitor and mediate the code of ethics.
- Continue small-scale support for certain functions within ONHAE such as the territorial demarcation agreements with colonist and native Kichwa communities and accounting transparency. Consider supporting a function of social and cultural planning that has broad participation (outside the general assemblies) Encourage the organization to take a greater role in the negotiations between communities in oil blocks and companies and encourage the companies to promote this notion. Encourage the organization to set up long-term interest-bearing funds for education and health and to allow the administration of these funds to some trusted organization.
- Be prepared to wait a long time for the situation to improve.

Support for the passage of a territorial circumscription law will help this situation as it would allow the Waorani to be officially represented by ONHAE as the territorial administrator and negotiations would have to involve the organization. Over the mid-term, assuming that Yasuni management is strengthened, the Waorani should be encouraged to seek co-management and eventually extend their territorial circumscription to the park. In the best of cases, the situation would evolve to the point that the companies would be obligated to deal with ONHAE rather than with individual communities and ONHAE would mature enough, and have enough high-quality advice, to do some serious social planning. Strengthening ONHAE could have the effect of encouraging communities to yield sovereignty to the organization, although this will not occur soon. Waorani in the park would derive income from protection under co-management agreements and they would have a trained cadre of park rangers to execute that function. There is clearly a role for credible advisors to ONHAE. Who those advisors should be is unclear, and in any case it would be unwise to be pushy about the matter at this point.

A final recommendation on the Yasuni issue is necessary. The best available evidence indicates that illegal logging interests catalyzed and possibly financed the murders of a number of Tagaeri-Taromenane in 2003 by other Waorani on the Tiguino River. As a Miami Herald report has it,

> "According to Penti Baihua, leader of a Huaorani community about eight miles from the massacre site, loggers have been working illegally on the river for years. But recently, a new, more aggressive breed has appeared. Usually armed and

from neighboring Colombia, those groups work closely with the Tiguino clan and others. "These strangers -- these Colombian loggers -- are going into Yasuni and the Tagaeri territory like they own the land," Baihua said. “They have rifles and are very dangerous people.”[21]

Confronted with this evidence, a representative of the MAE is reported to have said that they lack the firepower to deal with the invasion. One would have to recommend to USAID that the government be encouraged to employ the armed forces in this case, as the issue seems to be a question of Ecuadorian border security as well as human rights and biodiversity issues.

IV. B. Economic Base Recommendations

The infrastructure referred to in this case regards the economic base, the ways people make a living. The recommendations add to some of the suggestions made in the guidelines for income activities discussed in Section III.

B.1. Consolidating Indigenous Land Tenure

This is one of the activities of CAIMAN that is most impressive. It will go better in the future if the legal framework is clarified.

B.2. Marketing Remote Products by Air

At least one organization in Ecuador, the Chankuap Foundation in Macas, has had some success in marketing medicinal plant products, essential oils and peanuts by air from Achuar communities. The markets are national and international, principally in Italy. The same foundation locally markets handicrafts from Shuar and Achuar communities and manages a scholarship fund for secondary and university technical training. Their experience is worth study, and if closer inspection supports the promise we detected in our visit, USAID should consider helping them develop and expand their program in the future. The handicraft market may benefit from an association with Sinchi Sacha for the national market and CAIMAN should probably look into this possibility. Chankuap meets the guideline for organizations that would be desirable to work with and might be able to qualify for a direct relationship with USAID.

B.2. Other Income Strategies

The range of activities supported by USAID in the future should be reduced to a few that are managerially simple and meet the guidelines in section III. We would especially recommend the following:

- Aquaculture projects with native species should be supported in all indigenous territories that ask for such assistance. There is enough technical assistance available that programs could easily be of the farmer

[21] “In the Amazon, a mystery of murderous revenge and greed; A massacre in Ecuador's Amazon forest has yielded tales of revenge and exploitation involving Indian tribes and outsiders.” Jim Wyss, Miami Herald, July 11, 2004

to farmer type typical of World Neighbors and many other groups. Aquaculture is low-tech, does not require an infrastructure that must be maintained by a larger-than family group, does not depend on a complex process of development, provides income, and relieves pressure on natural resources. It is already becoming rooted in a number of indigenous groups and should be encouraged.

- We would not recommend USAID support for tourism activities carried out by communities unilaterally, certainly not with relatively short-term project funding, but we would recommend support for partnerships in cases where communities and tour operators can come to equitable agreements and a balance can be achieved within project life.
- It is unlikely that current sustainable natural forest management experiments carried out as pilot projects will spread widely, support very many people economically, or generate large amounts of the kind of social capital needed to resist the offers of the non-sustainable timber industry. While it is not recommended that USAID drop support for the existing experiments (after all, the major expenses are already in the past), at least one case of a joint venture for forest management between some indigenous organization and a reputable logging company should be explored within the next few years, along with other opportunities for forest management. The Fundación Forestal Juan Manuel Durini claims to have a model agreement for Ecuador negotiated with three Chachi communities, [22] but the agreement has not worked well so far according to the Fundación principally because of violations of the agreement by the communities involved.

  Another model for joint ventures in forest management that actually worked to the satisfaction of both indigenous people and the industry may be obtained through USAID/Nicaragua by asking the mission if they can obtain a copy of the Madensa/Awas Tingni agreement from MARENA (Ministerio de Ambiente and Recursos Naturales). The document should be from ~ 1994. There should also be agreements available from USAID/Guatemala for at least one of the community concessions, that of San Andres. In that case, I think it did not work well but it might be worth getting a report as a learning experience. Chemonics handles the current organization of technical assistance to the community concessions and they might be persuaded to investigate the case which they could do in a day or so of interviews if USAID hasn't compiled a report. There should also be some from Chemonics' experience in BOLFOR as well as I believe they intended to experiment. Allyn Stearman (personal communication, anthropologist of the Sirionó and Yuquí in Bolivia) reports that BOLFOR´s joint venture experiment with the Yuqui was a disaster but her article on the subject is still in development. However, she can be contacted at stearman@mail.ucf.edu for recommendations. It might be

[22] We have not seen this agreement. Mr. Fernando Montenegro says he will provide it to USAID/Ecuador if it is formally requested.

worthwhile to ask the EGAT biodiversity team in Washington to fund a study of cases. It may also be time to carefully review the experiences of certified natural forest management with indigenous people without the rosy lens produced by defending how we have spent money and with a careful anthropological analysis of the kinds of indigenous societies that have been successful.

- A permanent interest-bearing fund of $1-2m (one of the three mentioned in my presentation) should be established for training and fielding teams of voluntary forest rangers in each of the indigenous green areas that requests such a program. This activity should be thought of as an income strategy combined with a protection strategy combined with an ideological strategy, i.e, it covers infrastructure, structure, and superstructure all at once. The availability of such funding should be widely disseminated and proposals should be taken and analyzed in order to spend the money wisely. While the Cofán may not need such a program at the present time because of TNC Parks in Peril (PiP – USAID) funds, other green areas are in desperate need. The Cofán experience should be incorporated into the training as CAIMAN has done with the Chachi. The weakness of the current training is, of course, that there are no long-term funds for supporting the operation of a program. The experience in Central America suggests that voluntary rangers who work 4-5 days a month and are paid only for the days they work provide a low-cost way of defending territories[23]. The funds could be managed by one trusted foundation or several.

IV.C. Organizational Recommendations

Organizational recommendations in this case refer to the changes in organizational structures or their maintenance that seem to be required for success over the long-term.

C.1 Stable non-project-related funding for core operational costs of qualifying indigenous organizations.

After waiting for the past thirty years for Latin American indigenous lowland tropical forest ethnic organizations to find ways within their own constituencies to be supported, I am coming to the conclusion that we need to re-think our strategy for supporting them. If such indigenous people are to form stable organizations, they need stable funding and there is no sign that any has made much progress in reaching that goal. Instead, what we see are organizations that are beggars at the doorstep of projects or industries, projects creating leaders and then hiring them, leaders who derive their only income from conference per diems and what they can skim off project funding, leaders who demand large sums from deep-

[23] This article, as yet not submitted for publication is available from me in pdf form. astocks@isu.edu

pockets unwary donors without the knowledge of their own communities or organizations for non-existent projects, and occasionally honest, grass-roots, community-minded leaders who are so in demand by the several NGOs that work with them that they voluntarily attend meetings six nights a week until exhaustion and ennui overtake them and they finally retire from participation.

It is recommended in the Ecuadorian case that we experiment with an interest-bearing trust fund, again as in the case of forest protection, of $1-2m that can support the core three or four positions, the rent, electricity, and basic office equipment that is needed to keep core operations alive for a select number of organizations. This concept was discussed in the guidelines centering around the idea that an organization could then have both a long-term program and also shorter-term “soft money” projects and project staff. The key idea is to have a stable structure that a stable voluntary governing council (board of directors) can relate to, one in which the fact of actually having a paid elective job might be enough of a stimulus to seek re-election through better representation of the group. The positions funded should be the president, vice president, and (if present) administrative assistant and treasurer. The fund should also pay an outside accountant whose job it is to train the treasurer and to act as technical assistance over the long-term. The treasurer and administrative assistant should not be elective positions but rather be appointed by the governing council, and the governing council should be empowered to destitute elected officials if they are found to be incompetent or dishonest. The governing council itself should not consist of periodically elected officials such as the “presidents” of communities, but should rather consist of a stable group of elders named by their communities for long-term service. Most indigenous organizations have a number of “directors” that are in charge of various aspects of development. These positions should remain voluntary, elected, and should be funded only if they secure soft money projects that can support them. This structure would encourage the core organization to develop grant and project proposals in each area.

USAID should seek partners from industry and other Ecuadorian foundations to establish such a fund and should entrust the administration of it to one or more foundations that are close to the scene who may or may not be participating in the funding. As in the case of territorial protection, knowledge of the fund should be circulated widely and proposals should be accepted and analyzed. The initial funding period for a given organization could vary but it seems that 3-5 years might be enough time to do an evaluation to see if support has actually helped stabilize the group. Governing councils of supported organizations (as discussed in the Guidelines above) would participate in the evaluation. Continued participation would depend on continued progress and the criteria for progress would be clearly stated. A $2m fund would generate $100,000 each year which would be enough to fund 3-5 organizations at minimal levels.

C.2. Support for women's organizations

One of the interesting achievements of the CAIMAN project besides the focus on land rights, has been the support for income activities connected with handicrafts, activities that support both men and women, but with a majority of support going to women. Women in a number of communities tend to work together and we encountered several cases where specific locales are constructed in which women can work. CAIMAN supports a Waorani women's organization, AMWAE (Asociación de Mujeres Waorani de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana) for the purpose of centralizing the collection of handicrafts and marketing them through Sinchi Sacha. While there is little chance that the market will support the organization financially as well as returning significant incomes to the women who make the handicrafts, the organization serves an extremely useful purpose and deserves subsidizing. In this least acculturated group with which CAIMAN relates, Waorani women have not yet taken the submissive role one finds in more acculturated groups so assisting them in organizing actually contributes to maintaining their voice in political affairs of ONHAE. Furthermore, their voice tends to be conservative in terms of Waorani culture, especially as it regards the treatment of the forest. Support should be offered to women's groups in other ethnicities, especially when it can be determined that they will play a role in conservation ideology. Supports of this kind, again, touch on the economic, organizational and ideological levels of culture simultaneously. An immediate opportunity that CAIMAN should support with their next workplan is the *Marias del Sol*, a women's handicraft group trained by SUBIR and located in several Chachi communities on the middle reaches of the Cayapa River. Their handicrafts, particularly the basketry are developed. We observed their central workplace in Loma Linda which is still in good condition; they could benefit from a connection with Sinchi Sacha's methods of training and marketing. At this point the women are somewhat discouraged from the markets because the afro-ecuadorian populations who buy their products are practically as poor as they are and they lack outside markets.

IV.D. Recommendations relating to Ideology

D.1 Stable funding for educational programs

This suggestion is the last of the suggestions for interest-bearing trust funds. One of the things USAID has been very good at over the years is educational support, but the support has normally gone for university scholarships. A particularly successful program in natural resource management and conservation was associated with the RENARM project in Central America where MA-level scholarships went for various kinds of resource managers in several U.S. institutions including the U. of Idaho. Today, graduates of that program have responsible jobs, many as policy makers, in Central America. However, the problem confronting indigenous groups in green areas is twofold: 1) the education at primary level, present in nearly every "center," is poor. The bilingual

education system in Ecuador simply is not working to provide an adequate education. Even the oil companies recognize this fact in areas in which they are working. At least two of them are supplementing schools with university-trained teachers to help and provide on-the-job training to the high-school-level teachers who typically are assigned to the schools.

With this poor start, the students who actually can leave their home to study in the secondary schools (colegios) often find that they are behind before they even start. Colegios in rural areas are poorly equipped and staffed as well. And they cost money as well, because the student is not living at home. There is a high dropout rate and the ones who stay get substandard educations. As a result, according to one university professor who is connected with the USFQ in Quito estimates that the university positions open to indigenous students by several universities receive students who have the equivalent of a 4^{th} or 5^{th} grade education and they have to compete with students who have gone through a much higher quality education.

There is little USAID can do without enormous resources to upgrade the quality of primary education in indigenous areas. However, there is something that could be done at the secondary level, not so much equipping schools and training teachers, but supporting students for that level of education. There are a number of colegios in the Amazon region that have interesting programs, including both technical and academic studies. An example is the Instituto Técnico Salesiano in Macas. However, a fund for supporting indigenous students at the secondary level would not specify the institution. A $1-2m fund could function just as the funds for protection and organizational strengthening. Several donors could be asked to contribute. A foundation or consortium would manage the interest funds and indigenous organizations would submit proposals for $10-15K to be able to support their students. Payments would go the collaborating institutions who would provide student stipends and deduct matriculation fees. This system would strengthen the organizations because they would be the channels for the applications.

There could also be a separate fund for university scholarships, if the idea becomes popular within USAID. In this case, students would be encouraged to think of technical careers instead of merely academic careers qualifying them to teach school. While indigenous territories need teachers, they also need people who can work for the NGO community or for their own organizations in technical projects. A supply of technical people who know local cultures and languages is extremely short. Also, it is worth looking into Ecuador's experiment with an indigenous university in the Amazon. This experiment may be worthy of support.

In the end, investment in education in indigenous green areas, especially technical education, is an investment in conservation. In the current generation of indigenous young people, many do not wish to live their lives as farmers. They have other models in mind. With high rates of population growth, it is imperative

that they seek other alternatives to avoid having the green spaces become mere hollow green shells. In the best of cases, a situation like that of Panama's Kuna people could evolve in which the great majority of Kuna do not live in Kuna Yala. Rather they maintain it as a place to keep a home base to which they will return when they are able to retire, a place that is kept free of undesirable development in which they can live a life that reminds them of their forbearers.

There is an additional reason to emphasize educational supports. The high birth rates and falling mortality rates characteristic of indigenous people result in population growth rates as high as 4% per year in some indigenous groups. Educational levels and jobs that pay, especially for women, tend to lower birth rates.

D.2 Communication

One of the developments of the Shuar Federation (FICSH) over the years has been the innovation of radio programming. There has been a system of supplementing the education of two generations of Shuar children in remote schoolhouses with programming from Sucua in which experienced teachers give lessons and each rural school has a facilitating teacher who helps the children learn. The Achuar are beginning to do the same thing. A group that might benefit considerably from following their example is the Awá whose organization is involved in a struggle to develop the social capital necessary to have their communities resist the offers of the logging industry to cut down their forests. Their forests are perhaps the most valuable forests biologically in Ecuador for their unusual fauna and flora. FCAE desperately needs to have activities that will reach every community daily and reinforce the idea of territorial unity. In this case, the Interamerican Development Bank has ~$500K that is destined to improve communication among indigenous groups by providing a radio station. I would suggest that FCAE could benefit from this innovation. They should be assisted to learn from the Shuar how their education system is working and try to apply the same techniques. All of the other communicative advantages of radio could be applied as well such as public messages from people contacting families, public messages about logging threats, advances in the CTF, and other valuable programming.

In general, the time of total reliance on the shortwave radio system to maintain contact with remote communities may be coming to a close. The era of the cell phone is here. USAID should look at the costs of subsidizing repeater towers in several areas, perhaps beginning in the pacific lowlands where the spaces are not so vast in order to bring cell phone communication to areas such as the Chachi, Tsaachila, and Awá communities. All these groups need serious work in improving internal communication.

One relatively inexpensive assistance that could be rendered for the FICSH organization rather immediately would be to help them move a new more

powerful generator to their new radio towers. They are powering up their station to have more geographic reach, have the motor, but lack funds to move it.

Finally, it should be pointed out that the communication issue actually involves the introduction of technology which will alter certain social arrangements. Thus it could be easily subsumed under the infrastructural recommendations. It is here because it operates on all three levels of culture and has important ideological implications.

SECTION V – COMMENTS ON THE PROGRAMA NORTE, PROGRAMA SUR AND THE AMAZON BASIN INITIATIVE

In the Introductory section, I commented on the theory under which the ProNorte and ProSur projects are conducted, i.e., that improvement of road, bridge, water systems and other infrastructural elements combined with income projects, improved availability to social services and improvement in governance along both frontiers will predispose people to keep undesirable elements from using Ecuador as a safe haven from violence connected to the Plan Colombia or from supporting the narcotics industry out of sheer economic need. I also pointed out that there is an additional assumption that what is good for national development is also good for indigenous groups on the frontier and their control over – and conservation of – significant green areas.

While the two anthropologists doing this study were not allowed to visit the northern frontier for any significant time, we were certainly treated to a number of accounts about how one of the main Ecuadorian institutions, UDENOR, is functioning. Essentially, the view from the indigenous communities is that UDENOR activities are politicized, not that efficient and do not reach them. As I have no way of cross-checking the reality on-the-ground, there is little I can say about the validity of this view, except that newspaper reports during the six weeks of my stay tended to indicate that the large infrastructural projects in the north and south have focused on the major population centers and the most traveled communication routes, rather than focusing on indigenous populations and improved control over green areas. Additionally, it is clear that the violence on the other side of the border connected with the Plan Colombia, as well as the dollar economy, have been pushing migrants and refugees toward Ecuador, a process that may neutralize some of the improvements to livelihoods sought by the ProNorte project.

In both the northern and southern programs, the focus on population centers and main communication routes can easily be justified in normal development terms. Projects seek to maximize the number of beneficiaries, a goal that rather mechanically leads to certain decisions about where to work. However, there are at least two pragmatic arguments that would concentrate more resources for the

improvement of indigenous organizations, lives, and livelihoods and the maintenance of biodiversity.

The first of these arguments relates to the importance of indigenous groups like the Cofán, the Awá, the Secoya, the Shiviar, the Achuar, and the Shuar who inhabit border areas and control significant territorial extensions. If one goal of the North and South Programs is to secure the border, and there are relatively few people controlling relatively large extensions of the border, it would make sense efficiently to improve the lives of these people and to improve their ability to defend their territorial claims. Relatively little investment would have a relatively large impact. In this regard, it would be well to keep in mind that the overall objective is not necessarily to support one group over another, but to consolidate territory. The conflict between the Secoya and the Cofán over the area around Lagarto Cocha needs to be resolved to their mutual satisfaction. I strongly recommend that USAID support a process by which these two important groups can reach an agreement and that, under the Amazon Basin Initiative, they be supported to consolidate both sides of the frontier.

The second argument regards the concept of governance which can be thought of as having both a supply side and a demand side. On the supply side are the improvement of provincial, municipal, cantón, and parróquia government operations through better accounting, better planning, and more openness for citizen input. However on the demand side is the institutional strengthening of citizen organizations such that they are empowered and enabled to demand better government. From reading project papers and observing project activities, it would seem that both northern and southern frontier programs are heavily weighted toward working with the supply side. I would argue that institutional strengthening for indigenous organizations and legal support for their territorial agendas would contribute significantly to both conservation and good government. While governance (supply side) deserves support, surely governability (demand side) deserves equal attention.

Finally, with regard to the Amazon Basin Initiative (ABI), the current draft of the project concept paper focuses on site-based activities in a small selection of significant river basins connected to the main river and the establishment of a system of connections between organizations and between governments that will support conservation. The site-based activities contemplate working with indigenous groups in green areas as a major strategy for success.

The amount of funding is small compared to the vast space occupied by the Amazon Basin so it is important to focus on sites and strategies that will provide maximum conservation impact for each dollar spent. One of the realities in Ecuador is that the 1942 treaty that established the current boundaries of the country was not directed toward the welfare of indigenous people nor the conservation of biodiversity. All of Ecuador's border indigenous groups occupy both sides of the frontier and nearly all of them have taken some steps,

particularly the ones affected by the 1997 peace accords with Peru, to begin a dialogue with their cross-border counterparts. As there are considerable green areas that a stronger relationship could help protect, at least some funds should be made available to facilitate these trans-border relations, the consolidation of indigenous land tenure, and the harmonization of natural resource policies between indigenous neighbors.
One of the conservation activities that has been effective in improving political coherency and organizational resolve – social capital, if you will – is the participatory mapping of indigenous land claims as part of the process of territorial consolidation. The effects of such mapping, especially if backed up by other measures[24] are suprisingly powerful.

The same considerations would lead the ABI away from investing large sums in programs that have only indirect conservation effects such as health and education programs. Measurable improvements in the indices for these social services would cost much more than the amount available for conservation.

[24] See Stocks A. 2003. Mapping dreams in Nicaragu´as Bosawas biosphere reserve. *Hum. Organ.*
62(4):65–78 for an extended description of methods and results of this kind of activity. Also see the older article, Poole. P. 1995. *Indigenous Peoples, Mapping & Biodiversity Conservation: An analysis of Current Activities and Opportunities for Applying Geomatics Technologies*. BSP Peoples and Forests Program Discussion Paper 1995. Washington, D.C.: Biodiversity Support Program. More recently look at Chapin M, Threlkeld W. 2001. *Indigenous Landscapes. A Study in Ethnography*. Arlington, VA: Center for the Support of Native Lands.

APPENDIX I

Short Checklist for Activities that CAIMAN could integrate into the current project

Work with FINAE (Achuar) on assistance with the legalization of their five remaining centros.

Support ECOLEX in

- Change in SNAP system to allow titles
- Feasibility of a federal position as ombudsman for indigenous affairs
- Development of a code of ethics between oil interests and indigenous groups
- Identification of some respected individual or group for monitoring the code of ethics

Support for the Chachi Marias del Sol through Sinchi Sacha and the women of Sábalo and Sewaya.

Assist FICSH in getting the more powerful generator to Sucua for the upgrading of their radio station. (The Programa Sur could also do this.)

Coordinate with BID on a radio station in Awá or Chachi area.

Support the resolution of the Secoya/Cofán dispute over the Lagarto Cocha area.

Appendix 2

Program of Study and Interviews

LUGAR Y FECHA	*ENTIDAD*	*ACTORES*
Quito, Martes 21 de junio	Taller CAIMAN	ONG´S y Representantes de Organizaciones y Federaciones Indígenas involucradas con el Proyecto CAIMAN
Quito, Miércoles 22 de junio	Taller CAIMAN	ONG´S y Representantes de Organizaciones y Federaciones Indígenas involucradas con el Proyecto CAIMAN
Quito, Jueves 23 de junio	CAIMAN	Joao Queiroz, Director
Quito, Viernes 24 de junio	ALTROPICO	Jaime Levy, Director
Esmeraldas, Lunes 27 de junio	FICCHE	Consejo Directivo. Freddy Pianchiche Ex presidente de la FECCHE, Calixto Añapa y Orlando Cipriano
San Miguel, Martes 28 de junio	Comunidad Chachi de San Miguel	Directiva y habitantes de la comunidad
Balsareño, Jueves 30 de junio	FCAE y Comunidad Balsareño	Directiva y Representantes Awá de las Comunidades: Balsareño, Pambilar Alto y Mataje
Quito, Lunes 4 de Julio	Conservación Internacional	Jaime Cevallos, Coordinador de Proyectos Corredor Chocó - Manabí
Quito, Lunes 4 de Julio	WCS	Esteban Suárez,
Puyo, Martes 5 de Julio	FINAE (primera reunión)	Vicepresidente – Marco Aíj Comisión de Transferencia Canodros – FINAE – Miguel Vargas y Alejandro Taish
Puyo, Martes 5 de Julio	ONAHE	Presidente – Juan Enomenga Vicepresidente – Enquere Coordinador Proyectos CAIMAN – Timoteo Wamoni Ex presidente ONAHE – Camilo Wamoni Dirigente de Tierras – Cantapari
Quehueri-ono, Miércoles 6 de julio	Comunidad Waorani de Quehueri-ono	Directiva y habitantes de la comunidad
Puyo, Jueves 7 de Julio	AMWAE	Carmen, Coordinadora de Proyectos; Meñemo, Tesorera y Mujeres que elaboran artesanías
Puyo, Jueves 7 de Julio	FINAE (segunda reunión)	Presidente – Milton Calleras Vicepresidente – Marco Aíj Dirigente de Educación – Germán Vargas Dirigente de Tierras – Rubén Tramaren Dirigente de Comunicación – Luis Kawarin Asuntos Binacionales – Alejandro Taish
Gareno, Viernes 8 de julio	Comunidad Waorani Gareno	Representantes hombres y mujeres, jóvenes, niños y ancianos de la comunidad Gareno
Meñepari, viernes 8 de julio	Comunidad Waorani Meñepari	Directiva y habitantes de la comunidad Meñepari
Kapawi, lunes 11 de	Kapawi Lodge	Administrador – Virgilio

LUGAR Y FECHA	*ENTIDAD*	*ACTORES*
Julio		Guías Achuar – Celestino y Rubén
Ishpingo, lunes 11 de julio	Comunidad Achuar Ishpingo	Directiva: Síndico, vicesíndico, secretario, tesorero y habitantes de la comunidad
Wachirpas, lunes 11 de julio	Comunidad Achaur Wachirpas	Directiva: Síndico, vicesíndico, secretario, tesorero y habitantes de la comunidad
Amuntai, martes 12 de julio	Misión Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe. Familia de Corde Jesu	Hermana superiora de la Misión: Ana
Macas, martes 12 de julio	Alcalde del Cantón Morona	Alcalde – Sr. Rodrigo López Integrantes del Proyecto Sur
Sucua, martes 12 de Julio	FICSH	Integrantes del Consejo de Gobierno
Macas, martes 12 de julio	PSUR	Mario Añazco Gerente Regional y Técnicos de los Proyectos del PSUR
Santa Rosa, miércoles 13 de julio	Proyecto Plan de Manejo Integral de la Microcuenca del Río Wuapula Chico	Presidente, tesorera y técnicos de la Junta de Aguas Regional de Santa Rosa
Sevilla, miércoles 13 de julio	Instituto Sevilla. Proyecto de acuicultura	Ricardo Burgos. Técnico de la Fundación Arcoiris
Huambi, miércoles 13 de julio	Asociación de Trabajadores de la Comunidad El Tesoro. Proyecto Microfinanzas rurales	Presidente, Secretario, Vicepresidente, Tesorero y Vocal de la Asociación de Trabajadores de la Comunidad El Tesoro. Técnico de la Fundación Arco Iris
Macas, jueves 14 de Julio	Misión Salesiana	Moseñor Pedro Gabielli
Macas, jueves 14 de Julio	Fundación Chankuap	Matteo Radice, Técnico Laboratorio y Paul Arévalo Técnico Comercialización de la Fundación Chankuap
Guadalupe, jueves 14 de julio	Proyecto Aja Shuar	Mujeres involucradas en el Proyecto del Aja shuar. Mery Pandam Técnica
Macas, jueves 14 de Julio	Proyecto Extracción y Comercialización de Madera por Cables	Asociación de Técnicos Locales Shuar del Centro 18 de Febrero. Damián Villacrés, Técnico de la Fundación Jatun Sacha
Ibarra, lunes 18 de Julio	FCAE	Olindo Nastacuaz, Presidente y Hugo Paredes Coordinador de Proyectos
Quito, martes 19 de Julio	USFQ	David Romo, profesor de la USFQ, Director de la Estación Tiputini y Director del GAT
Quito, martes 19 de Julio	Chemonics	David Gibson Chemonics Consultant
Quito, martes 19 de Julio	Walsh Environmental Scientiests and Engineers, Inc.	Mark Thurber, Director.
Quito, martes 19 de Julio	First Nations	Richard Wagner
Quito, miércoles 20 de julio	U. S. Embassy	Nelson Yang (RSO briefing)
Quito, miércoles 20 de julio	OISE	Colón Payaguaje, Vicepresidente José Panchano Presidente del Centro Siecoya Remolino Vicente Tangoy, Presidente de la comunidad Eno Silvio Piaguaje Presidente de la

LUGAR Y FECHA	*ENTIDAD*	*ACTORES*
		comunidad San Pablo Humberto Piaguaje, Técnico para la negociación con la Occidental
Quito, miércoles 20 de julio	Fundación Jatun Sacha	David Thomas, Técnico Forestal y Nubia Jaramillo Técnica Forestal
Quito, miércoles 20 de julio	ECOLEX	Manolo Morales, Director de ECOLEX y Presidente de CEDENMA
Quito, jueves 21 de Julio	Fundación Sinchi Sacha	Juan Martínez Director y Marlo Brito Coordinador
Quito, jueves 21 de Julio	USAID	Environment Team
Quito, jueves 21 de Julio	Fundación Durini, ENDESA/BOTROSA	Fernando Montenegro Director
Quito, viernes 22 de Julio	OXY	Fernando Granizo, Relacionador Comunitario
Quito, viernes 22 de Julio	BID	Steven Stone
Quito, viernes 22 de Julio	ENTRIX	Gustavo Rodríguez
Quito, viernes 22 de julio	Terra Group (Houston)	Rob Wasserstrom
Quito, lunes 25 de Julio	U.S Embassy	Vanesa Schulz, Political Section
Quito, lunes 25 de Julio	TNC	Paulina Arroyo, Directora Programa Parques en Peligro
Quito, lunes 25 de Julio	ECOLEX	Manolo Morales
Quito, lunes 25 de Julio	REPSOL – YPF	Remigio Rivera, encargado de los Asuntos con los Huaoranis
Quito, martes 26 de Julio	FSC	Randall Borman, Director
Quito, martes 26 de Julio	USAID	Presentación de Anthony Stocks
Quito, martes 26 de Julio	FEINCE	Luis Narváez, Presidente; Robinson Yumbo representante de Dureno, Victor Quenamá representante de Sinangüé, Elisa Umenda encargada de venta de artesanías, Carmen Umenda Presidenta de la asociación Shameco de Sinangüé
Quito, jueves 28 de Julio	USAID	Teleconferencia con ABI
Quito, jueves 28 de Julio	USAID	Presentación de Anthony Stocks
Quito, viernes 29 de Julio	ICCA	Graducación de Guardaparques Chachis
Quito, lunes 1 de agosto	FEPP	Xavier Villaverde, Coordinador de Proyectos

APPENDIX 3

GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT INDIGENOUS GROUPS AND THEIR ORGANIZATIONS

AWA

LENGUA	POBLACION	UBICACIÓN	ORGANIZACIÓN		TIERRAS
Awapít	3445 habitantes[25]	Esmeraldas (Costa) y Carchi e Imbabura (Sierra)	22 centros		121.000 has legalizadas
			Máximo representante la Asamblea, luego el Consejo Directivo representado por la Federación de comunidades Awá del Ecuador (FCAE), y directiva de cada comunidad.		5.000 has de posesión ancestral no legalizadas[26]
			Directiva de la FCAE Elección cada tres años. Próxima elección 2007	Presidente – Olindo Nastacuaz Vicepresidente – Alfonso Pai Dirigente de Organización – Simón Canticush Dirigente de Educación – Luis Cantincush Dirigente de Salud – Juan Guanga Dirigente de Tierra Territorio y Biodiversidad – Germán Cantincush Dirigente de la Mujer – Filomena Rosero Dirigente Zonal del Carchi – Bolívar Nastacuaz Dirigente de Esmeraldas e Imbabura – Felipe Cuajivoy	Ninguna comunidad dentro de una Reserva Ecológica, pero algunas se encuentran en la zona de influencia de la Reserva Ecológica Cayapas – Mataje. En 1998 el Estado Ecuatoriano declaró la Reserva Étnica Forestal Awá

[25] http://www.codenpe.gov.ec/npe.htm
[26] Ibíd.

CHACHI

LENGUA	POBLACION	UBICACIÓN	ORGANIZACIÓN		TIERRAS
Cha´palaa	8.040 habitantes 457 familias[27]	Esmeraldas	50 comunidades, 28 centros jurídicos		105.468,52 has legalizadas[28]
			Representantes: Gobernador de cada cantón (5 cantones), y la Federación de comunidades Chachi del Ecuador FECCHE, y directiva de cada comunidad		Comunidades dispersas en el Norte y Sur de la provincia de Esmeraldas
			Directiva de la FECCHE Elección cada tres años (Próxima elección agosto de 2006)	Presidente – José Cimarrón Vicepresidente – Alfonso Añapa Tesorero – Wilton Díaz Dirigente de Fortalecimiento – Orlando Cipriano Dirigente de Recursos Naturales y Territorio – Leovigildo Añapa Dirigente de Educación – Isario Sannicolás Dirigente de Producción y Comercialización – Ricardo Nazareno Dirigente de Juventud – Wagner Añapa Dirigente de la Mujer y Familia – Alicia Añapa Secretario – Martín Quiñónez Dirigente de Salud – Alberto Quintero	Comunidades de la zona norte se encuentran dentro de la Reserva Ecológica Cotacachi – Cayapas Algunas comunidades de la zona sur están en la Reserva Ecológica Mache Chindul Algunas se encuentran en la zona de influencia Cayapas - Mataje

[27] http://www.codenpe.gov.ec/npe.htm
[28] Ibíd..

COFAN

LENGUA	POBLACION	UBICACIÓN	ORGANIZACIÓN		TIERRAS
A´ingae. Posible Familia Lingüística Chibcha	1000 habitantes	Sucumbíos	6 comunidades legales jurídicamente, y 5 nuevas		148.907 has de territorio
			Máximo representante la Asamblea, luego el Consejo Directivo representado por la Federación Indígena de la Nacionalidad Cofán del Ecuador FEINCE. Ademas existe un Consejo conformado por los presidentes de cada comunidad.		33.571 has legalizadas: Dureno, Duvuno y Chandia Na´en[29]
			Directiva de la FEINCE. Elección cada tres años. Próxima elección diciembre de 2006	Presidente – Luis Narváez Vicepresidente – Roberto Aguinda Secretario – Nicolás Ortiz Tesorero – Bolívar Lucitante Comisión de Territorio – Randall Borman Comisión de Salud – José Hernández Comisión de Educación – Ramón Yumbo Comisión de Mujer – Graciela Quenamá Comisión de Jóvenes – Armando Yumbo Coordinador de Proyectos – Emeregildo Criollo	Todas las comunidades a excepción de Dureno y Duvuno se encuentran en áreas protegidas y por lo tanto no tienen título legal, pero mantienen un acuerdo de uso y manejo con el Ministerio de Ambiente. Comunidad Zábalo dentro de la Reserva de Producción Faunísitica Cuyabeno. Bermejo, Chandia y Tayosu Conqque en la Reserva Ecológica Cofán Bermejo. Sinangüe dentro de la Reserva Ecológica Cayambe Coca

[29] http://www.codenpe.gov.ec/npe.htm

SECOYA

LENGUA	POBLACION	UBICACIÓN	ORGANIZACIÓN		TIERRAS
Pai coca. Familia Lingüística Tukano Occidental	380 habitantes	Sucumbíos	3 comunidades jurídicamente legales, 1 comunidad en proyecto		39.414.5 has legalizadas
			Máxima autoridad la Asamblea, luego la Organización Indígena Secoya del Ecuador OISE, directiva en cada comunidad.		Comunidad Siecoya Remolino 24.371,1 has Comunidad San Pablo de Catësiaya 7.043,4 has Centro Eno 8.000 has[30] Lagarto Cocha aún sin territorio definido en la frontera Perú
			Directiva de la OISE	Presidente – Ricardo Payaguaje Vicepresidente – Colón Payaguaje	Zona norte del territorio de Siecoya Remolino y Lagarto Cocha (frontera con Perú) dentro de la RPFC Las otras dos comunidades se considera están en el área de influencia de la RPFC

WAORANI

LENGUA	POBLACION	UBICACIÓN	ORGANIZACIÓN		TIERRAS
Wao tededo. Familia Lingüística única	2700 habitantes	Pastaza, Napo y Orellana	36 comunidades		703.339 has legalizadas[31]
			Organizados en la Organización de la Nacionalidad Huaorani del Ecuador ONAHE		
			Directiva de la ONAHE Elección cada 4 años (nuevo) Próxima elección finales de agosto de 2008	Presidente – Juan Enomenga Vicepresidente – Ehuenguime Enqueri Coordinador – Ramón Huani Dirigente de Educación – Felipe Enqueri	5 comunidades dentro del Parque Nacional Yazuní. Las otras están en la zona de influencia del PNY. El grupo Tagaeri – Taromenane en Zona Intangible.

[30] http://www.codenpe.gov.ec/npe.htm
[31] http://www.codenpe.gov.ec/npe.htm

LENGUA	POBLACION	UBICACIÓN	ORGANIZACIÓN		TIERRAS
				Dirigente de Tierras – Cantapari Cahuya Dirigente de Turismo – Tementa Nenquihui Dirigente de Salud – Vicente Guiquita	Territorio Waorani, PNY y Zona Intangible dentro de la Reserva de Bioesfera declara en 1998 por la UNESCO

ACHUAR

LENGUA	POBLACION	UBICACIÓN	ORGANIZACIÓN		TIERRAS
Achar Chicham. Familia Lingüístic a Jívaro	5.000 habitantes 720 familias	Pastaza y Morona Santiago	60 centros, 4 Asociaciones en Pastaza, 4 Asociaciones en Morona		884.000 has legalizadas
			Representados por el Consejo Directivo de la Federación Indígena de Nacionalidades Achuar del Ecuador FINAE. Actualmente están tratando de cambiar su nombre jurídico a Nacionalidades Achaur del Ecuador NAE. Una directiva en cada comunidad dirigida por un Síndico		133.014 has por legalizar[32]
			Directiva de la FINAE Elección cada 3 años. Próxima elección Enero 2006	Presidente – Milton Calleras Vicepresidente – Carlos Aij Dirigente de Tierras – Rubén Tsamaren Dirigente de Promoción y Organización – Luis Kawarin Dirigente de Educación – Germán Vargas Dirigente de Salud – Jorge Canelos Dirigente de – Desarrollo Económico	Ninguna parte del territorio está o forma parte de Áreas Protegidas, Reservas Ecológicas o Parques Nacionales.

[32] http://www.codenpe.gov.ec/npe.htm

LENGUA	POBLACION	UBICACIÓN	ORGANIZACIÓN		TIERRAS
				Alternativo – Rafael Antuash Asuntos Binacionales – Alejandro Taish	

SHUAR

LENGUA	POBLACION	UBICACIÓN	ORGANIZACIÓN		TIERRAS
Shuar Chicham. Familia Lingüística Jíbaro	110.000 habitantes[33]	Sucumbíos, Orellana, Napo, Pastaza, Morona Santiago, Zamora Chinchipe y Guayas (Costa) Elecciones cada 3 años	490 centros. 668 comunidades que agrupa la FICSH		900.688 has en total 718.220 has legalizadas (según registro del año 2001 del CODENPE)[34]
			Máximo representante el Consejo de Gobierno representado por la Federación Interprovincial de Centros Shuar FICSH, federación que abarca la mayoría de los centros. Además han conformado una Comisión de Vigilancia compuesta por miembros notables de la Nacionalidad Shuar: Tec. Patricia Arcos, Prof. Bosco Atamaint y Lic. Marcelino Chumpi. Otras centros están organizados y representados por la FIPSE, OSHE, FESHZ y FENASH		1´500.000 has de territorio. 300.000 están delimitadas (datos según reunión con la FICSH)
			Directiva de la FICSH. Elección cada 3 años. Próxima elección Enero de 2008	Presidente – Luis Enrique Cunambi Sua Vicepresidente – Jimpikit Ernesto Sharup Dirigente de Tierras – Jintiash Roendo Nuirnkias Dirigente de Trabajo – Sofía Vega Anduasha Dirigente de	Dos comunidades dentro de la RPFC sin título pero con acuerdo de uso y manejo con el MAE Algunas comunidades en el Parque Nacional Sangay Comunidades en el Parque Nacional Podocarpus

[33] http://www.codenpe.gov.ec/npe.htm
[34] Ibíd..

LENGUA	POBLACION	UBICACIÓN	ORGANIZACIÓN		TIERRAS
				Educación – Carlos Juep Ushap Dirigente de Comunicación – Luis Marcelino Jimbicti Putzuma Dirigente de Salud – Wawashington Tiwi Dirigente de Mujeres – Josefina Tunki Tiris	Comunidades de Sucumbíos en la zona de amortiguamiento de la Reserva Ecológica Cayambe Coca

APPENDIX 4
Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAAS	American Antropologist Asociation
ABI	Amazon Basin Initiative
AMWAE	Asociación de Mujeres Waorani de la Amazonia Ecuatoriana
BINGOS	Big International No Governmental Organizations
BOLFOR	Bolivian Forestry Project
BSP	(People and Forest Program)
CAIMAN	Conservation in Manager Indegenous Areas
CEDENMA	Comité Ecuatoriano de Defensa de la Naturaleza y el Medio Ambiente
CI	Conservación Internacional
CODENPE	Consejo de Nacionalidades y Pueblos del Ecuador
CONAIE	Consejo de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador
COWASH	Comité Wambisa Shuar
CSE	Cultural Survival Enterprisees
CTF	Center for Forest Transfornation
EGAT	Economic Growth, Agricultura and Trade (a USAID central office)
FAN	Fondo Ambiental Nacional
FCAE	Federación de Comunidades Awá del Ecuador
FEINCE	Federación Indígena Cofán del Ecuador
FENASH	Federación Nacional Shuar (Sede Pastaza)
FEPP	Fondo Ecuatoriano Populorum Progressio
FESHZ	Federación Shuar de Zamora
FICCHE	Federación Indígena de las Comunidades Chachi del Ecuador
FICSH	Federación Interprovincial de Centros Shuar
FINAE	Federación Indígena Achuar del Ecuador
FIPSE	Federación Interprovincial Shuar del Ecuador
FLACSO	Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales
FSC	Fundación de Sobrevivencia Cofán
GAT	Grupo Asesor Técnico
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IACHR	Inter - American Court of Human Rights
IBD	International Bank Development
ICCA	Instituto para la Capacitación y Conservación Ambiental
ILO	Internacional Labor Organization
IVA	Impuesto al Valor Agregado
MAE	Ministerio de Ambiente del Ecuador
MARENA	Ministerio de Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (Nicaragua)
NGO	No Governmental Organization
OISE	Organización Indígena Secoya del Ecuador
ONAHE	Organización de la Nacionalidad Huaorani del Ecuador
OSHE	Organización Shuar del Ecuador
PNP	Parque Nacional Podocarpus
PNS	Parque Nacional Sangay
PRODEPINE	Proyecto de los Pueblos Indígenas y Negros del Ecuador
PUCE	Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador
RENARM	Regional Natural Resources Management Project (USAID/Central America)
RPFC	Reserva de Producción Faunística Cuyabeno

SNAP	Sistema Nacional de Areas Protegidas
TNC	The Nature Conservancy
UDENOR	Unidad para el Desarrollo de la Frontera Norte
URACCAN	Universidad de las Regiones Autonomos de la Costa Caribe Nicaraguense
USAID	United Status Agency for internacional Development
USFQ	Universidad San Francisco de Quito
WB	World Bank
WCS	Wildlife Conservation Society
WWF	World Wild Federation (Also World Wide Fund for Nature)
YNP	Yasuní National Park